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TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RIGHTS: A
VALUATION FOR EFFICIENT ALLOCATION
I. INTRODUCTION
A comparative approach to transboundary water' law seeks a princi-
ple as elusive as the governed medium, a principle which attempts to distill
water issues and rights to a central idea or list of ideas. Scholars are at
variance in defining the salient principles behind transboundary water law.2
However, a common idea embodied in these discussions emerges: the value
of riparian3 rights.
The world's "first commodity"4 is not only subject to economic valua-
tion but, to a much greater extent, legal valuation. Cost distortions that
misallocate water arise from several sources. First, externalization of cost
distorts the real value of water. Evidenced in the legal doctrine of prior
1. "Transboundary waters' means any surface or groundwaters which mark, cross or are located
on boundaries between two or more states;" Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and Int'l Waters, art. 1, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312 (1992).
2. "[C]urrent population growth has to be the single, most salient factor affecting both water
supply and water quality." Ann Berkley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement
Relating to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713 (1985); Xue Hanquin,
Relativity in International Water Law, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENv-L. L. & POL'Y 45, 46 (1992) (identifying two
fundamental principles of water law: (1) equitable utilization, and (2) prevention of water pollution);
Paul Marshal Parker, High Ross Dam: The International Joint Commission Takes a Hard Look at the
Environmental Consequences of Hydroelectric Power Generation - The 1982 Supplementary Order, 58
WASH. L. REv. 445 (1983) (fundamental principle of international water law identified as: (1) absolute
sovereignty of each nation within its boundaries; and (2) equitable apportionment); Melissa Crane,
Diminishing Water Resources and International Law: U.S.-Mexico, A Case Study, 24 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
299 (1991) (the reason for a lack of a notable principle in groundwater law is: (1) Scientific uncertainty,
(2) territorial sovereignty, (3) Competing doctrines in environmental law); Gretta Goldenman,
Adapting to Climate Change: A Study of International Rivers and Their Legal Arrangements, 17
EcoLOoY L. Q. 741 (1990) (the treaties neglect an understanding of variables in water principles
because those variables are changing as a result of, inter alia, climate changes); Julia R. Wilder, The
Great Lakes as a Water Resource: Questions of Ownership and Control, 59 IND. L. J. 463 (1984)
(problems in water rights stem from the demand on transcontinental water exportation); Dante A.
Caponera, Patterns of Cooperation in International Water Law: Principles and Institutions, 25 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 563, 587 (1985) ("Agreements on the allocation of costs and benefits are sufficient to
determine each state's share and responsibilities ...").
3. "'Riparian Parties' means the parties bordering the same transboundary waters." Supra note
1; A riparian owner has access or the right to access a navigable river. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141, 173 (1900); Navigability is not navigability in fact as in the English sense. County of St. Clair v.
Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 55 (1874).
4. The First Commodity, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 1992, at 11.
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appropriation,5 or in subsidies,6 these distortions often originate from the
assignment of property rights of entitlement to water, thereby disrupting
efficient use of this valuable resource. For example, consider the situation
where agrarians receiving water at below cost, flood their lands to irrigate.
Aside from losses by evaporation, this practice increases the rate at which
fertilizers leach into return flows, increasing the nutrient content of the
stream. This in turn escalates bacteria count, and eventually the down-
stream riparians must treat this water in order to make it potable. In this
example, the costs of efficient use have been disrupted because the non-
assignment of true or real costs creates greater costs in the end. Secondly,
sovereignty is perhaps the most cost distorting factor because inefficient
policies are tied to the concept of sovereignty.7 In a world with rapidly
growing population and dwindling potable water supplies,8 this resource
may continue to be worth blood.9
This comment will compare various approaches to the allocation of
transboundary water rights. First, an overview of the different sources of
water and the systems in place to allocate those waters is presented. Some
inaccuracies in the information upon which scholars rely will be clarified.
Secondly, basic water law concepts, used in the treatment of transboundary
water rights, will demonstrate how existing regimes distort efficient alloca-
tion of this resource and create waste. Various treaties, cases, and codes
will be presented to form a basis for problems inherent in transboundary
water dispute resolution. Finally, a proposal will be forwarded that may
aid decision-makers in negotiating agreements. A market-based approach
grounded on the initial equitable apportionment threshold evolves as the
best successor to an administratively determined allocation.
II. LEGAL UNDERSTANGING OF THE HYDROLOGIC CYCLE
A. The Hydrologic Cycle and Data
The hydrologic cycle consists of evaporation of open bodies of water,
transpiration from biological units, precipitation, groundwater flows, and
surface water flows.10 The current stage of transboundary water law'
emphasizes surface flows and groundwater or aquifer sources.11 A "drain-
5. H. Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency:
The Colorado River, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 111, 123 (1980).
6. See supra note 4.
7. This concept assumes many forms, for example the so called "food security" issue leads to
inefficient use of water. Id.; Self-sufficiency in food production can take on extreme distortions,
especially in a world historically devoted to trade. Saudi Arabia has become the world's seventh largest
exporter of wheat, but must sell it at a quarter of the cost. Priit J. Vesilind, Water: The Middle East's
Critical Resource, NAT'L GEOoRAPH-C, May 1993, at 57.
8. See supra note 4.
9. "'The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics,' UN Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali." Vesilind, supra note 7, at 51; India and Pakistan have fought three full-scale
wars over water rights since 1948. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Surface Water in the Iberian Peninsula- An
Opportunity for Cooperation or a Source of Conflict, 59 TENN. L. REv. 803 (1992).
10. TAYLOR R. A LEXANDE & GEARY S. FICrTER, ECOLOGY 112 (1973).
11. See generally Hanquin, supra note 2.
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age basin" may encompass both surface and subterranean sources. The
term will be used to address both systems for the purposes of this com-
ment.12 It should be noted, however, that the drainage basin concept is not
universal. 13 In order to determine the relative value of a commodity, par-
ties need objective information. Scholars and jurists alike recognize the
problem of attaining a good factual base so that riparian rights can be allo-
cated appropriately. 14 Our understanding of the hydrologic cycle demon-
strates that different sources of water are valued differently. For this
reason, laws must be sensitive to the real long-term values of water. The
more sophisticated society's understanding of the hydrologic cycle is, the
more accurate the law can be in reflecting the rights allocated. Nations
recognize the need for accurate data1 5 when dealing with contentious water
rights, but may lack the technology to attain it. 6 Some nations have the
resources to draft treaties that contemplate extensive hydrologic relation-
ships which exist in transboundary water systems. 7 Perhaps the most
encouraging document that recognizes these areas is the Bellagio Draft
Treaty, which addresses supply."' Once accurate data is obtained, the laws
must respond to a dynamic, self-correcting regime to allocate this
commodity.
Some regions use data on water levels in making a comparative analy-
sis of transboundary riparian rights.' 9 This data may include information
on recharge rates, seasonal levels, or water quality. Even at this late stage
of development2' a problem exists in determining the exact share of each
contending drainage basin in an equitable apportionment scheme.21 Most
states follow the equitable apportionment scheme in allocating trans-
12. Some agreements marry the flow of water to the basin concept. "An international drainage
basin is a geographical area extending over two or more States determined by the watershed limits of
the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THm FIFrY-SEcoND CONFERENCE HELD AT HEIsmls
chap. 1, art. II. (1966) [HELSINICI RULES].
13. The International Law Commission was unable to agree on the "basin" concept on whether
subterranean flows should be included. Robert D. Hayton, Observation on the International Law
Commission's Draft Rules on the Non-Navigational Uses Of International Watercourses: Articles 1-4, 3
CoLO. J. INT'L ENvrL POL'Y 31 (1992).
14. See ALBERT E. UTrON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 16
(1981); JOHAN G. LAmMERs, POLLrIoN OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 18 (1984).
15. "The agreements shall provide for the establishment of joint bodies [charged with the tasks]
... inter alia ... to elaborate joint monitoring systems concerning water quality and quantity." See
supra note 1, art. 9.
16. Vesilind, supra note 7, at 50.
17. See Crane, supra note 2.
18. Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft
Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663 (1989).
19. See B.R. CHAUHAN, SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BAsINS (1981).
20. The cradles of civilization tended to be inseparable from surface water flows such as the
Euphrates, Tigris, Nile, Danube, Rhine, Seine, Mekong, and Yangtze. See supra note 4; Thomas
O'Neil, The Mekong, NAT'L GEOORAPHIC, Feb. 1993, at 11; See supra note 2, at 12.
21. Leo Goss & Albert E. Utton, Settlement of International Water Law Disputes in International
Drainage Basins. By B.R. Chauhan, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 192 (1985)(book review).
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boundary riparian rights.22 The principle set forth by the Institute of Inter-
national Law in 1911 states the basic idea behind equitable apportionment:
no sovereign may use or allow waters to be used in such a way that would
seriously injure another state.23 The contemporary lawyer must be willing
to deal with technical concepts of hydrology, hydrogeology and related sci-
ences' in order to determine the fact-intensive notion of equitable use.
Indeed, the new standards mandate the use of "best available technology"
in attaining hydrologic information.25 The assignment of relative values to
the source of transboundary waters is essential to this calculation. Only
when values are determined can sovereigns set priorities in times of crisis.
B. Groundwater
Some scholars resurrect inaccurate or misleading concepts of the
hydrologic cycle.2 6 Legal scholars', jurists', and sovereigns' identification of
the source of water in dispute is essential for accurate value assessment27 of
ultimate riparian rights. Sources must be identified at the outset of the
value-determining process. Generally, groundwater sources can be identi-
fied as rechargeable from surface rains or flows, non-rechargeable, or the
source may have elements of each.28
A bright line definition may be evidenced in the nomenclature associ-
ated with various sources. Water is "mined" when the net recharge rates
are less than rates of withdrawal.29 The mining concept clarifies the dual-
ism evidenced by elements of rechargeable and non-rechargeable charac-
teristics in a single aquifer. Short-run problems can occur if data is lacking
on recharge rates. Long-run problems occur where subterranean water-
courses have changed their flows, thus altering the existing hydrogeology. 30
Careful monitoring of an aquifer can remedy these situations when they
occur. But for the majority of conditions, the mining threshold is readily
identifiable, understandable and workable. Where only a century ago the
existence of subterranean water-courses was unforeseeable,"' today con-
22. "Riparian parties shall cooperate on the basis of equality and reciprocity .... See supra note
1, art. 9, § 2(a).
23. Introduction to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. VI, ch. 3 (1987).
24. See Hayton, supra note 13, at 31.
25. Supra note 1, art. 9 § 2(i).
26. "[T]he reality that surface waters feed groundwaters. . Melissa Crane, Diminishing Water
Resources and International Law: U.S.-Mexico, A Case Study, 24 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 299 (1991)
(erroneously overbroad).
27. CLARK E. CORKER, ET. AL., GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRAnON
A1-30 (National Water Commission, PB-205-527 1971).
28. Id.
29. Patrick E. Corbett, Note, The Overlooked Farm Crisis: Our Rapidly Depleting Water Supply,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 454, 455, n. 3 (1986).
30. The Bellagio Draft Treaty does not directly address this long-run scenario; however, the
International Boundary and Water Commission's conferences have established joint commissions to
"measure, distribute and manage shared waters." Bellagio Conference on International River
Commissions, TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REPORT, Summer 1993, at 1.
31. Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 2 N.Y.S. 289 (1888).
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temporary legal regimes have detailed information on aquifer data.32
Indeed, the "sharing of data" clause is turning up in contemporary agree-
ments with increasing regularity.33
The Bellagio Draft Treaty's excellent treatment of varied water sup-
plies demonstrates an understanding of the rechargeable groundwater val-
uation problem:
"Drought" means a condition of abnormal water scarcity in a specific area
resulting from natural conditions. "Drought Alert" means the declared con-
dition provided for in Article XII. "Drought Emergency" means the declared
emergency provided for in Article XII."
By stratifying the levels, the treaty contemplates the differing values of
water like no other treaty before it. Article XII establishes a "Drought
Management Plan," which outlines a use and warning system for sover-
eigns to effectuate with their border denizens.35 The onus is on the sover-
eign to monitor groundwater by maintaining a database on the water
levels. 3
6
C. Nonrechargeable and Fossil Aquifers
The economics of nonrenewable natural resources differs from that of
renewable natural resources.37 An economic valuation of this source must
govern the intelligent use of this commodity to achieve the long-term pri-
orities of a sovereign. For example, nonrechargeable groundwater drawn
from nonrechargeable aquifers, may become dry, too alkaline, or too saline
for consumption with continued draft .3  Given the limited nature of this
resource, it must be treated differently than rechargeable sources, which
usually have a lower replacement cost than nonrechargeable sources. Pol-
icy makers and covenanting parties must evaluate waters in making use of
nonrechargeable resources efficient. For example, nonrechargeable waters
may be best designated as strategic reserves when relative values of water
are high; by no means should such sources be used for a seasonal agrarian
project where the economic justification for the crop is unlikely to justify
the removal of that resource for eternity. A valuation threshold may be
evidenced by the relationship:
t5(&)FVf(y,y') + DC > RMP
32. PAUL S. OsBoRNE, Environmental Protection Agency: Suggested Operation Procedures for
Aquifer Pumping Tests, EPAJ54015-93/503 Feb. 1993, at 2; J. SIDENVALL, Safeguarding the Water
Supplies in Uppsala, Sweden, GROUNDWATER POLLrION IN EUROPE, (John A. Cole ed., 1974); EDWIN
H. CLARK, II & PHILuP J. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER: MANAGING THE UNSEEN RESOURCE: A
HANDBOOK FOR STATES (1992).
33. See, e.g., infra note 57.
34. Hayton, supra note 18, at 678.
35. I& at 707.
36. Id. at 688.
37. JOHN McINERNEY, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY
40 (John A. Butlin ed., 1981).
38. Vesilind, supra note 7, at 62.
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In this example, policy-makers may determine the value of the
nonrechargeable source by multiplying the likelihood of the crisis event's
occurrence (w) times the real cost of the resource during those times (e) as
adjusted for the future value, with the term being a function of the year at
which the next crisis will occur (y) and the number of years that resource
will remain viable once tapped (y'). The cost of alternative sources should
then be added in the event of actual source depletion (DC). If this value is
greater than the current real market price adjusted for distortions (RMP),
then that source should not be accessed.
Fossil aquifers39 are a source of groundwater that must undergo a capi-
tal-intensive desalinization process. The brackish nature of this water
source may be the result of latent mineral deposits, intrusion of tidal
waters, or withdrawal from aquifers at such a rate that mineral concentra-
tions remaining reach non-potable levels.1° This process is undertaken by
some countries in order to make the water potable, but remains
uneconomical for agrarian pursuits.41
The Bellagio Draft Treaty does not directly address a contingency plan
on how to differentiate these waters outside of the drought scenario. The
treaty does, however, open the door for some type of dialogue regarding
so-called "transboundary groundwater conservation areas."'42 The dispute
resolution process set forth in the Bellagio Draft Treaty emphasizes mutual
agreement and charges a commission to determine the appropriateness of
various actions under prevailing conditions.43
At this point, the core of the problem with riparian right valuation
breaks down. "Equity" and "reasonable use" are illusory when sovereigns
allow the use of all sources, all of the time, irrespective of cost. Unless the
concepts of equity and reasonableness have a benchmark, traditional ineq-
uities will persist. Moreover, valuation analysis will help in the long-run.
The more rechargeable the source, the more it should be used in routine,
low-cost situations." As it stands now, most aquifers are freely accessible
at the will of the user. Indeed, sovereigns promote such behavior. These
decisions are made when sovereigns act as job suppliers and market partici-
pants; sovereign as agrarian or sovereign as utility are the most common
examples.
D. Groundwater Rights and Reason
Most groundwater sources are best protected by the laws of traditional
nonrenewable resources. Correlative rights protect users of a common
aquifer. Under the doctrine of correlative rights, when waters are not con-
fined to the borders of a land owner (or sovereign) the user of the common
39. These are aquifers with brackish waters. Vesilind, supra note 7, at 62.
40. See generally Vesilind, supra note 7, and ALEXANDER, supra note 10.
41. Vesilind, supra note 7, at 62.
42. Supra note 18, at 692.
43. Supra note 18, at 693.
44. See also Corker, supra note 27, at A1-38.
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aquifer must not waste the water or make unreasonable use of that water.45
Since all landowners hold coequal rights,' an equitable use of the aquifer
is assured. This doctrine is commonly used in the oil and gas context.4 7
The parallel between petroleum and nonrechargeable aquifers is obvious as
both are nonrenewable commodities.
The problem with the reasonableness standard is that the true value of
the resource is distorted. Nations often believe their behavior to be rea-
sonable when it is not. Sovereigns who refuse to trade, or who promote
wasteful industries for sovereignty's sake, are unreasonable from an eco-
nomic perspective. 48 When parties allocate transboundary water rights by
agreements, the compacts they create should utilize an economic valuation
of the resource. Data on the aquifer is essential to successful fact-pleading
in an arbitration or negotiation when determining reasonableness.
E. Surface Flows and Prior Appropriation
Surface flow visibility allows for greater accuracy in allocation com-
pared to complex groundwater flows. Perhaps the instances of surface flow
misallocation result from the perceived simplicity and availability of this
source. However, legally imposed economic distortions abound. Water
subsidies to agrarians are a great source of distortion, but are by no means
the only one.49 A legal doctrine alive in the American West, as applied to
treaties, generates severe distortions. Under the doctrine of prior appro-
priation, once an individual appropriates water and puts such water to ben-
eficial use, that individual has a valid right to divert and use that quantity of
water against all riparians who appropriate water later in time.50 This doc-
trine has been applied within a state as well as across borders.51 The bene-
ficial user need not be limited to groundwater; surface flows are included
under this doctrine as well.52
Prior appropriation hails from the turn of the century, when govern-
ments placed little or no value on natural resources.53 Although its intent
was to make unsettled land productive, this doctrine exists vestigially in
multinational treaties.54 Prior appropriation distorts the true value because
it assigns a property right to a commodity on an entitlement basis. Vari-
ables that often go into the valuation of a commodity are completely absent
in the prior appropriation regime. Location, shortage risk, source of water,
prevailing quality, and externalities of the hydrologic cycle are disregarded
45. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
46. Correlative rights and reasonable use are often indiscernible. See supra note 27, at vi-vii.
47. See Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
48. See, e.g., Vesilind, supra note 7.
49. See also note 4.
50. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963).
51. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S 589 (1945).
52. See Corker, supra note 27, at viii, ix.
53. Zach Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget" The Case of Markets, Water and Environment,
15 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 391, 396-97 (1992).
54. "(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share.., is to be determined by relevant factors ...
[including] ... (2)(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin ... ." HELSINKI RuLEs ch. 1, art. V.
19931
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
under the non-dynamic concept of "first in time." Commodities should be
subject to the dynamic forces of risk allocation present in a market
environment.
Law and economics scholars have presented strong evidence demon-
strating that an equal sharing regime leads to profit maximization over a
prior appropriation scheme."5 A prior appropriator with superior rights
will not be maximizing his profit if he continues to repeat behaviors that
yield consistent losses in the aggregate; he will continue to produce waste-
ful products until the sovereign compels the appropriator to do otherwise.
The withdrawal of a subsidy usually puts a stop to wasteful endeavors.
Agriculture is the largest institutional user of water.5 6 Such use may be
"beneficial" in the eyes of the entitled but economic and environmental
heresy to most others.
F Agreements Attempting to Deal with Values
The basis for a strong international market-based regime exists in sev-
eral agreements. The Agreement on Cooperation on Management of
Water Resources in the Danube Basin57 between the Federal Republic of
Germany, the European Economic Community, and the Republic of Aus-
tria, sets strong criteria for exchange of information when determining the
management of the Danube.58 Although this treaty functions as little more
than an "agreement to agree," the data disclosure function gives parties a
strong basis upon which to allocate riparian resources. This type of agree-
ment represents an excellent opportunity for each riparian to make mar-
ket-based arguments that assure that appropriate flows are determined
with attention to allotment, water quality, and economic impact of dimin-
ished flows. These values, once agreed upon, would be present in the
resulting compact.
The Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters59 contains
clauses for the allocation of short-term shortages, but not for long-run
shortages. Like the Bellagio Treaty it contemplates water supply reduc-
tion." Surpluses are allocated proportionally to pre-existing rights.6 1 The
surplus treatment could be characterized as inefficient if the preexisting
rights are not profit-maximizers.62 Thus, we return to the idea of prior
appropriation. A problem with the very establishment of this treaty was
the historical notion of water entitlement for agrarian pursuits.63 Such
entitlement based thought circumvents any notions of efficient use. Hence,
55. Burness, supra note 5, at 121.
56. Supra note 4; see Crane, supra note 2, at 301.
57. Agreement on Cooperation on Management of Water Resources in the Danube Basin, Dec. 1,
1987, F.R.G.-Aus.-EEC, 1990 OJ. (L 90) 2.
58. Id. art. 1.
59. Agreement on the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, Egypt-Sudan, 453
U.N.T.S. 51 (1959).
60. Supra note 29.
61. See Goldenman, supra note 2, at 767.
62. See generally Burness, supra note 5.
63. See Goldenman, supra note 2, at 750.
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the agrarian practices in Egypt demonstrate a misallocation by wasteful
use.
64
Similarly, the Agreement on Sharing the Ganges' Waters65 contem-
plates allocation for short-term shortages, but does not contemplate long-
term allocations. The base allocation is fixed, and the surplus is propor-
tional.' To some extent these allocations are indicative of a more dynamic
system as compared to a pure prior appropriations system. Fortunately,
the prior appropriation elements in this agreement do not vest until times
of plenty.
The Treaty on the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Rio
Grande 67 sets priorities, not temporally, but by most crucial needs. 6
Notions of equity favor this type of allocation over an absolute grant in
time. For example, there is a general preference for domestic use over
69agrarian use. These priorities allow a sovereign to allocate in times of
crisis; however, an administrative solution is not required. Market priori-
ties are clear. In most markets, water for domestic use is a higher priority
than recreational use and is priced as such both in times of crisis and in
non-critical times.7°
G. The Problem with Administration
The Agreement on Regulations of Boundary Waters71 between Spain
and Portugal establishes minimum flow guarantees to Portugal, the down-
stream riparian. Unfortunately, the International Joint Commission (IJC)
was unable to establish minimum flows of the Guadiana, a river of decreas-
ing flows resulting from Spain's use and pollution.72 This is the problem
that results when non-private parties defer to a third party on allocating
rights when that third party does not have a direct interest or a benchmark
with which to measure flows.
The inequities of the Guadiana result from inefficient transboundary
natural resources management.73 Moreover, these inequities strikingly
64. Id. at 750-51.
65. Agreement on Sharing of the Ganges' Waters, Nov. 5, 1977, Bangl.-India, 17 I.L.M. 103
(1978).
66. Goldenman, supra note 2, at 758.
67. Treaty Relating to Water Utilization of the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Rivers, Feb. 3,
1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 944 (1944).
68. Crane, supra note 2, at 302.
69. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 620.
70. See, e.g., APS Review Gas Market Trends, Arab Press Service Organization, Dec. 21, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arab Press Service File; Phil Hampton, Despite Cost, Drought-Hit
California Tests Desalination, Gannett News Service, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Gannett News
Service file; Gerald Kopplin, Minnesota Infant Fish Farming Industry Faces Opponents, UPI, Jan. 24,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Teresa Carp, The State vs. The Quagmire, OaEGoN
BUSINESS, September, 1988, at 97.
71. Agreement on Regulations of Boundary Waters, Nov. 20, 1866, Spain-Port., 129 Consol. T.S.
453.
72. Dellapenna, supra note 9, at 812.
73. L.F.E. Goldie, Equity and the International Management of Transboundary Resources, 25 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 665 (1985).
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illustrate the essential nature of disclosure. Information on water quality
and flow levels was the missing link that would have helped the down-
stream riparian make its case. The lack of this information compromised
Portugal's position74 in that no foundation for argument existed until things
went seriously awry. Political and budgetary constraints on a sovereign or
other third-party commission resource often leave such bodies unable to
respond to the need for constant monitoring, necessitated by the dynamic
nature of this resource. Unfortunately, many contemporary agreements
call for "management" of resources without reference to an economic valu-
ation. Other agreements are sensitive to some economically-based versus
administratively-based allocation of waters.75 The matter of Guadiana
would be best dealt with by covenants drafted by parties who hold an inter-
est in the riparian flow: Spain, Spanish riparians, Portugal, and Portuguese
riparians. Regarding the pollution of the Guadiana, the upstream riparian
is sending costs downstream in the form of pollution. Transboundary ripar-
ians would do well to document costs of remedies or lost profits. The Gua-
diana is dramatic evidence that the IJC is not the best allocator of
resources. A market solution is required, but only after a benchmark of an
equitable level is established. That benchmark must evolve from data.
III. A SYSTEM FOR VALUATION: RESOURCE EFFICIENCY
A. Off on the Right Foot: Initial Equitable Apportionment
Both upstream and downstream riparians should begin from an initial
equitable apportionment (IEA) before negotiating any agreement or sign-
ing any treaty. The compact that develops should bind all riparians to eco-
nomically tenable, market-based value of this resource. This market
approach to water allocation is not a new concept.76 The accumulation of
data and projections based on historical usage, rate growth, climatological
data, and water sources,' are essential to agreement. Adjusting provisions
allowing for amendment as new data comes forward is essential to an
enduring agreement. An assessment of variables in the long run will assure
riparian progeny of a level of economic stability regarding this essential
commodity. Premiums should be paid to riparians who choose not to sub-
sidize or maintain industries which are perpetuated by loss-generating gov-
ernmental programs. It is essential that the IEA favor efficiency over
entitlement. That efficiency can only be achieved if the compacts created
74. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 9.
75. Compare, Maastricht Treaty, EEC, art. 130-39, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) ("[T]he
counsel, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt... measures concerning town and
county planning [of the] management of water resources."), with Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community, Jun. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 (1991) ("The objectives of [the agreement] ... [are]
to contribute ... to the ... long-term sustainable development of the river basin.")(emphasis added).
76. See generally CORKER, supra note 27.
77. For example, nonrechargeable sources may be designated by sovereigns as "reserves"




are responsive to changing market forces. Provisions allowing amendments
upon a showing of changed circumstances are essential. In the long-run,
riparians will bid for more or less allocation78 depending on expected vari-
ances from the IEA. This market-based approach may avoid some of the
environmental damages inherent in many transboundary water agree-
ments,79 damages resulting from agreements that are unresponsive to new
information.
B. Externalities
Waste is a product of inefficiency and occurs when commodities are
not properly valued. Improper valuation of true costs to an economic sys-
tem is largely the result of externalities. Externalities are those costs which
accrue to society-at-large from the acts of individual parties.' ° Sovereigns
attempt to cure the injurious effects of externalities through regulatory
regimes or taxing policies.8 Withholding subsidies is often more beneficial
to the efficient producers in the short-run, and to the prosperity of the sov-
ereign in the long-term. Central to any efficient market is accurate infor-
mation.82 Indeed, the ideas set forth in this comment mandate a duty on
the parties to disclose information so an equitable allocation of rights is
possible. Information on water quality and flows could have helped the
case of the Guadiana. Information from riparians on lost profits or
increased costs would help settle claims. To internalize these externalities,
it is essential to determine their true costs and then create provisions in the
transboundary water agreements that address these costs.
C. Pareto Efficiency
Once the IEA is established and the true costs of various situations are
ascertained, the system will be self sustaining. The agrarian will pay the
urbanite for greater use of water, in an attempt to reach Pareto efficient
trade,83 where both parties are satisfied. The value of water to industries in
an urban center will be compared to the competing agrarian users'
valuation.
The assignment of non-absolute property rights is the initial stage in
creating a market where values can be assessed and ultimately exchanged.
Property rights are non-absolute because the doctrine of waste is never left
out of the calculation. Bargaining from these market-established rights, the
parties cannot fail to reach an efficient outcome.8 As with all markets,
information freely exchanged among the parties determines the proper val-
78. See Corker, supra note 27, at A1-38-A1-41.
79. Wtlley, supra note 53, at 398-399.
80. See JoHN A. Bu-uN, THE EcoNoxcs OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
PoLicY 3, 23 (John A. Butlin ed., 1981).
81. See MclNE, EY, supra note 37, at 55.
82. See MICHEL POTIER, THE ECONOMICS OF ENvR oNMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES
POLICY 183 (John A. Butlin ed., 1981).
83. See HAL 1. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONohacs, 546-47 (1987).
84. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
1993]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
uation of rights. This move away from the concept of sovereigns holding
absolute property rights8' toward an efficiency-based market system
focused on the long run will resolve most of the problems revealed in the
multipartite malaise that is transboundary water law.'
D. Demands on the System
The governing body of a sovereign would do well to be sensitive to the
demands of various economic sectorsa7 on consumptive water use.' In the
aggregate, inputs to the economic activity of choice determine the price the
goods can fetch in the world market.89 Favoring endeavors of positive eco-
nomic impact would help determine notions of equitable use. Existing evi-
dence demonstrates that a shift from traditional water uses to new
applications results in positive economic impact, whereas subsidies have a
negative impactf 0 The choice in output, if left up to the water resource
consumer, would favor the more profitable alternative.9  For example,
agrarians are starting to learm the value in producing higher-vatue, less-
thirsty crops.92 These wealth-increasing practices will continue only if users
are made to pay for the true value of water. Privatization of state-owned
water systems is the first step in this process. The real valuation of water
has proven itself effective in not only allocating the resource more effi-
ciently but also creating environmentally-friendly and profitable
outcomes.9 3
Nations must look to the entirety of the hydrodynamics within their
borders. They must assess the waters accessible, the external demands such
as population growth, and the industrial base. The advocacy of economic
valuation of these factors is catching the ear of international organiza-
tions.94 Once these factors are made part of a long-term plan, nations will
be able to intelligently come to the negotiation table and draft treaties
based on market reason. Usufructuary principles must be abandoned if
transboundary water rights are to be allocated in such a way as to be self-
sustaining.
85. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 281-92 (1898).
86. See, e.g., supra note 2,
87. See CORKER, supra note 27, at A1-38.
88. Parties may favor various industries over others. An eye on the factors required to produce
the products of a given industry are important for intelligent long-run planning of water uses and needs.
For example, one gallon of milk requires five gallons of water, one gallon of gasoline requires ten
gallons of water, one pound of synthetic rubber requires 300 gallons of water. ALEXANDER & FIcHTER,
supra note 10.
89. See, e.g., Japanese Technology: Highest Frontier, Economist, Dec. 2, 1989, at 13.
90. Wifley, supra note 53, at 407.
91. See generally Coase, supra. note 84.
92. Rice Crackers, ECONOMISr, Aug. 7, 1993, at 58.
93. The United Kingdon's privatization of water companies began with a valuation system
favoring cost of supply versus cost of the customer's home, such a system is environmentally preferable.
Greenery and Poverty, EcoNowVs-r, Sept. 18, 1993, at 80.




The failure to assign a real value to water denies society of the neces-
sary touchstone for resolving transboundary water rights. Externalities and
subsidies form some distortions that lead to waste. Any legal framework
based on entitlement of water by the assignment of a usufructuary property
value in a dynamic world economy is as responsive to change as a fly in
amber. These entitlement-based vestiges, present in many transboundary
treaties, are responsible for much of the waste evidenced.
Sovereigns should use market based rationalizations when making
decisions on transboundary water rights. Once the parties determine an
initial equitable position, provisions in the agreement to account for
changes in system dynamics, based on full disclosure of all hydrological
data, will play a central role to a truly equitable agreement. Sovereigns
should focus on the long-term as population increases and demand strains
the finite supply of potable water. These demands on the hydrologic sys-
tem must be planned in advance, so each water user can be held to the
disciplines of this commodity market.
Martin F. Medeiros
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